EXHIBIT A

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                     IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 2
                   FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
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     STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel,
 5
     W.A. DREW EDMONDSON, in his
     capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL
 6
     OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
     et al.
 7
               Plaintiffs,
 8
     V.
                                             No. 05-CV-329-GKF-PJC
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     TYSON FOODS, INC., et al.,
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               Defendants.
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                    REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                           HAD ON AUGUST 18, 2009
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                               MOTION HEARING
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     BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY K. FRIZZELL, Judge
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     APPEARANCES:
20
     For the Plaintiffs: Ms. Kelly Hunter Foster
                           Assistant Attorney General
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                           313 N.E. 21st Street
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                           Mr. David Riggs
2.3
                           Mr. David P. Page
                           Mr. Richard T. Garren
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1	(APPEARANCES CONTINUED)		
2	For the Plaintiffs:	Mr. Robert A. Nance Riggs Abney Neal Turpen	
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5		Mr. Louis W. Bullock Bullock Bullock & Blakemore	
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7		Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119	
8		Mr. Frederick C. Baker Ms. Elizabeth Claire Xidis	
9		Motley Rice LLC 28 Bridgeside	
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11	For the Tyson Foods	Mr. Robert W. George	
12	Defendants:	Tyson Foods, Inc. 2210 West Oaklawn Drive	
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14		Mr. Jay T. Jorgensen Mr. Gordon D. Todd	
15		Sidley Austin LLP 1501 K Street NW	
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17	For the Cargill Defendants:	Mr. John H. Tucker Ms. Theresa Hill	
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1	(CONTENTS CONTINUED)
2	For the Defendant Mr. A. Scott McDaniel
3	Peterson Farms: Ms. Nicole Longwell McDaniel Hixon Longwell & Acord PLLC
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5	For the George's Mr. Woodson Bassett
6	Defendants: Mr. Vincent O. Chadick The Bassett Law Firm
7	Post Office Box 3618 Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701
8	
9	PROCEEDINGS
10	August 18, 2009
11	THE COURT: Be seated please.
12	THE CLERK: We're here in the matter of Attorney
13	General State of the State of Oklahoma, et al excuse me,
14	State of Oklahoma, et al. vs. Tyson Foods, Inc., et al.,
15	05-CV-329-GKF. Will the parties please enter their appearance.
16	MR. BULLOCK: Louis Bullock for the State of Oklahoma.
17	MS. FOSTER: Kelly Foster, the State of Oklahoma.
18	MR. NANCE: Bob Nance for the State of Oklahoma.
19	MR. BAKER: Fred Baker for the State of Oklahoma.
20	MR. GARREN: Rick Garren, the State of Oklahoma.
21	MR. RIGGS: David Riggs, the State of Oklahoma.
22	MS. XIDIS: Claire Xidis, the State of Oklahoma.
23	MR. TUCKER: John Tucker and Theresa Hill and Del
24	Erich for the Cargill defendants, Your Honor.
25	MR. BASSETT: Woody Bassett and Vince Chadick for the

1 Eagan very sensibly rejected that argument. 2 Then the next slide. Talking about the knowledge --3 and this is an important point, if these defendants are 4 seriously going do contest what they know. 5 THE COURT: All right before we move on from 6 necessary. Certainly poultry waste is a necessary result of 7 growing chickens. What of the point when Mr. Jorgensen argues 8 here that nuisance is not a necessary result of spreading 9 poultry litter, and in that regard is the state ready to 10 stipulate and agree that state regulation pertaining to the 11 spreading of poultry waste is inherently ineffective? 12 MR. NANCE: That is a question that assumes the only 13 state regulation is the Nutrient Management Plan scheme, 14 because the state regulation says there shall be no runoff. 15 And you-all discussed that in connection with another motion 16 earlier. 17 THE COURT: Right. But by making the arguments you're 18 making, are you saying that you are incapable, you the State 19 are incapable of preventing runoff, although you allow it to be 20 done? 21 MR. NANCE: Are we incapable. Let me think... 22 THE COURT: In other words, you are seeking an

THE COURT: In other words, you are seeking an injunction against the defendants to prohibit them from spreading poultry litter in this watershed; correct?

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MR. NANCE: Specifically from allowing any runoff,

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which is, I think, as a practical matter going to be either a
completion cessation or very severe restriction because the law
prohibits runoff. And in this watershed particularly, runoff
is inevitable because of the things that we've discussed about
the geology and the slope and all of that.
         THE COURT: All right. So you're admitting that in
some cases then the complete cessation is not necessary if
runoff is not the necessary result or runoff doesn't occur;
correct?
         MR. NANCE: I don't know that I'm admitting that, Your
Honor, I didn't intend to.
         THE COURT: All right, so which is it, are you seeking
the complete prohibition of the spreading of poultry waste or
are you saying that some spreading is allowable as long as
there is no runoff?
         MR. NANCE: We're seeking the complete cessation of
spreading.
         THE COURT: All right. So, therefore, the allowing
the spreading of poultry litter is inherently ineffective.
         MR. NANCE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I was listening to
the wrong person in your courtroom, I apologize. If I could
have that question again?
         THE COURT: So are you agreeing that state regulation
here with respect to the spreading of poultry litter is per se
ineffective?
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MR. NANCE: It's ineffective to the extent that there is runoff. But you're saying that short of complete THE COURT: cessation that there is going to be runoff, in other words, there is no regulation that would be effective. MR. NANCE: Well, the part of the regulation that is effective, and that's the part we're trying to enforce, is the no runoff part. THE COURT: All right. But you're saying that the only way to prevent runoff is to completely cease the spreading of poultry litter; correct? MR. NANCE: We want a cessation so -- a cessation of any runoff is what we are after, Judge. THE COURT: You're avoiding my question, Mr. Nance. So you're saying that some poultry waste can be spread as long as it's done properly and runoff would not occur; is that correct? MR. NANCE: Your Honor, we think based upon the facts that Mr. Baker has shown you, the evidence is that runoff is inevitable or virtually inevitable. Now we're enforcing a

MR. NANCE: Your Honor, we think based upon the facts that Mr. Baker has shown you, the evidence is that runoff is inevitable or virtually inevitable. Now we're enforcing a scheme here particularly in the State of Oklahoma part of the watershed which says there shall be no runoff. It might be demonstrated by Mr. Jorgensen or by the defendants that there is some place where it could properly be applied and not cause runoff, but the overwhelming amount of the time is it's going

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to cause runoff and it would be a rare and wonderful thing where it did not. So that's probably as good an answer as I can give you to your question and I hope it's a satisfactory one because the prohibition is on runoff. And the whole Nutrient Management Plan argument -- if I can use an analogy. I drove here from Edmond this morning and there are speed limit signs posted all along the turnpike and the speed limit unless it tells you different for construction is 75 miles an hour. But the law also says you cannot drive in a manner that is -- a speed that's excessive under the circumstances or is dangerous under the circumstances. That is also the law and you can't blow through a construction zone or you can't blow through an icy patch at 75 miles an hour and think you are protected because you're not. And the circumstances in this watershed are that over the overwhelming majority of the times there's going to be runoff. And so you can't say but the speed limit is 75 because you've told me the speed limit over here is 75, I can do 75. You can't. And the Nutrient Management Plan that Ms. Foster showed you the other day has the requirement in that you obey all the other laws. And so it's not a defense and it's not a permission. THE COURT: But you're are saying except in the rare circumstance adherence to the Nutrient Management Plan is going to result in runoff, and but for that rare circumstance everyone is violating the law?

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MR. NANCE: I think that's correct. But we're suing the defendants, we're not suing all of these farmers. We think the defendants have the obligation under 427B and other theories to control the waste that their birds present. It's not — it's not an action against the farmers or it's not an action against the people that the farmers give the waste to. It's an action against these defendants whose birds create the waste and they have, we believe, the legal responsibility to properly dispose of that waste and we don't even get to the Nutrient Management Plan part.

THE COURT: What of Mr. Jorgensen's related argument that state authorization prevents the State from seeking an injunction here?

MR. NANCE: The State does not authorize pollution of the water. In fact, the State prohibits pollution of the water. If you look at Section 50, or Title 50, Section 4 which says that anything done under a statute is not a nuisance.

What is done here that is a nuisance is the pollution of the water, or under other statutes like 2-6-105, placing waste where it's likely -- there's a preventive aspect of this -- where it's likely to get in the water. And likely is the language from 427B as well. And Mr. Jorgensen didn't come up here and present any evidence that says it's not likely. He says they have experts and they have studies but they are not in this record and on the record that's before you it is likely

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     Masci M-A-S-C-I, 53 S.Ct. 599, 601. The cases are many in
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     which a person acting outside the state may be held responsible
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     according to the law of the state for injurious consequences
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     within it. The liability is commonly imposed under
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     circumstances for maintenance of a nuisance.
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              So it's clear that common law can get conduct in
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     Arkansas, Oklahoma common law.
              One other thing I neglected to mention, and if counsel
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     wants to address it he can. Their brief, their opening brief,
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     2033 says public nuisance damages must be limited to abatement.
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     They agree that there are damages for abatement. I didn't hear
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     that mentioned in the argument and with that I'll --
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              THE COURT: Didn't I decide at the motion to dismiss
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     stage that the Oklahoma statutes had no application in
     Arkansas?
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              MR. NANCE: The Oklahoma, yes, you're correct.
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     conduct in Oklahoma we had statutory authority.
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              THE COURT: Right. But I thought we had already
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     addressed the issue whether or not our statute had reach in
20
     Arkansas.
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              MR. NANCE: You're correct.
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              THE COURT: Okay. All right, I had heard it --
              MR. NANCE: For contact in Oklahoma we have the
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     explicit statute under our act.
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              THE COURT: Right. Okay.
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              MR. NANCE: And then we're not licensing or
     authorizing, whatever they do in Arkansas, so it's not a
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     defense to what they are doing.
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              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jorgensen, on that point?
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              MR. JORGENSEN: Your Honor, I have nothing to really
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     to add beyond the fact that you're correct, that you did hold
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     that the state statutory claims would not apply in Oklahoma --
     I mean, excuse me, rather in Arkansas. And I did not address
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     abatement because of your damages ruling. We saved ourselves a
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     lot of time.
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              THE COURT: Specifically recall though we didn't
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     decide that Oklahoma common law didn't prevent a nuisance?
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              MR. JORGENSEN:
                              That's precisely right. That's why I
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     did argue that today, Your Honor, and said time is finally here
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     on that.
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              THE COURT: I understand. Okay.
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              MR. BULLOCK: Judge, in terms of the individual
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     causation, could we join the Cargill motion on that. I know
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     they have some individual twists, but it might be more
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     efficient since there's an awful lot of overlap between the
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     individual Cargill causation and other larger causation.
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              THE COURT: Any objection to that?
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              MR. JORGENSEN: We're not prepared, Your Honor, to
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     handle it in that fashion. We divided them separately.
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              MR. BULLOCK: I thought Mr. Tucker was about to say
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our position that for that reason the direct cause test which
is mandatory as to proceeding against Cargill cannot be
satisfied by any of the evidence. Thank you, sir.
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you. We'll take a quick recess.
We'll be back in a few minutes.
         (Recess).
         THE COURT: Be seated please. To defendants' motions
for summary judgment on counts four and five, that motion will
be granted in part and denied in part. It will be granted only
as to the Oklahoma nuisance claim as applicable to activities
in the State of Arkansas. It will be otherwise denied.
         As to motion for summary judgment number 2055, that
motion is denied based upon the briefing and the arguments.
         With regard to motion number 2062, that motion will be
denied.
         With respect to motion number 2069 that motion
similarly will be denied.
         As to motion number 2079 and Cargill's motion or
joinder -- well, excuse me, I'll hit that next. With respect
to motion number 2079, the motion for summary judgment of
defendant Cargill, Inc. and Cargill Turkey Production, LLC,
that motion will be denied and Cargill's joinder in motion
number 2069 which is separately docketed as motion number 2086
is denied.
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We will take a closer look at trial with regard to the